 |
Randy Goodis, P.A. © 2005 |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
 |
Law
Offices of
Randy Goodis, P.A. |
|
888-DUI-8DUI
- Toll Free
305-389-1833 - 24 hours |
 |
|
|
 |
 |
The Fellow Officer
Rule and It's Implications in DUI Cases - continued
"Necessary Assistance"
In some states, probable cause can be transferred not
merely from fellow officers to one another, but also from
a person enlisted to aid in an officer under a "necessary
assistance" statute. Such statutes allow a police
officer making a lawful arrest to command the assistance
or aid of any person he deems necessary to make an arrest.
The person commanded to aid the officer then has the same
authority to arrest as the police officer has. For example,
the State was able to salvage its arrest in State
v. Eldridge, 565 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), by
relying on Florida's necessary assistance statute, section
901.18. The officer who stopped Eldridge did so in connection
with a theft investigation. While he was stopped, the
officer noticed indicia of alcohol intoxication and called
in a back-up officer. The first officer attended to the
theft issue while the second officer made the arrest for
DUI. The Florida appellate court held that the arrest
was valid even though the second officer did not witness
Eldridge driving, because the second officer had been
summoned under the necessary assistance statute and thus
had the same authority as the first officer.
However, the doctrine is not without limits. In Riehle
v. State, Dept of highway Safety, and motor Vehicles,
684 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the defendant was stopped
by an auxiliary state trooper, whom Florida law specifically
provided had no arrest powers. The auxiliary trooper called
in a supervisor who performed roadside exercises and then
took the defendant into custody for DUI.
The same court decided Eldridge concluded that
the arrest here was not valid, specifically distinguished
Eldridge on the basis that the original officer who stopped
Eldridge had arrest authority that could be transferred
to the assisting officer, whereas the auxiliary trooper
who stopped Riehle had no arrest authority and thus had
nothing to transfer to the assisting officer.
So in our example above, If officer Smith lacked statutory
authority to arrest Defendant, but Officer Jones possessed
such authority, the arrest is not saved by the necessary
assistance statute even though it was effected by Officer
Jones who had arrest authority; Smith, as the summoning
officer, had no authority that he could transfer. Thus,
where the state relies on such a provision to justify
the arrest of your client, the first order of business
is to determine whether the officer who sought assistance
had authority to make a DUI arrest in the just instance.
Conclusion—
Because of the increasing reliance across the country
on specialized, DUI-trained officers to flesh out probable
cause determinations in DUI cases, the practitioner is
well advised to become familiar with the interrelated
laws regarding who must possess probable cause information
to effectuate a valid DUI arrest. It provides fertile
grounds for challenges to any DUI prosecution. |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
|